Political narratives, especially populism, often outpace the tangible results of economic policies. Both left and right parties tend to present their proposals based on ideology rather than real effects, sometimes resorting to polarization and punishment. In the short term, this generates favorable headlines for promoters; in the medium and long term, it leads to significant setbacks for the country. Donald Trump's tariffs are a clear example, but similar cases exist in Europe and Catalonia. In Europe, the regulation of artificial intelligence illustrates this phenomenon well. On one hand, American tech giants and their leaders have been systematically discredited, facing multimillion-dollar fines that far exceed the taxes collected from the European digital industry. Peter Thiel and Elon Musk have been recent targets of this offensive, despite Thiel being born in Frankfurt and Musk having South African roots. Their ideological stances have fueled a persecution that transcends economic debate. Interestingly, there has not been the same rigor applied to Chinese companies like TikTok, despite their repeated violations. The second axis has been the creation of supposedly protective legislation for European citizens against abuses by American multinationals, which is not applied with the same severity to Chinese companies. The result is a bureaucracy so complex that its review is already being considered unsustainable. This approach, focused on penalization and excessive regulation, has diverted attention from the real problem: the lack of European AI companies capable of competing globally. Thus, Europe is repeating the scenario experienced with social networks and cloud services in the 2000s, lagging behind the United States, whose GDP now exceeds the European by 50%, when two decades ago they were equal. Previously, it was the GDPR, with "bad guys" like Zuckerberg, Microsoft, or Google; today it is the AI Act, with targets like Thiel, Musk, and Altman. The outcome: headlines for politicians and a worse situation for European citizens. The problem was not the Americans or the Chinese, but Europe's structural deficiencies. Locally, housing policy follows a similar pattern. The diagnosis is clear: Catalonia has experienced strong population growth and greater talent attraction, in a context of stagnant per capita GDP and flat purchasing power since 2008. Access to housing is becoming more complicated, and pressure on the rental market—small and unprofitable—increases. The administration, one of the most bureaucratic in Europe, has barely promoted public housing beyond headlines. The solution is evident: facilitate the construction of the three million homes Spain needs, especially in Madrid, Barcelona, and other metropolitan areas. However, incentives, land availability, and current bureaucracy hinder this. Proposed policies repeat mistakes: criminalizing the real estate sector, labeling everyone as speculators, even ethical funds like the Norwegian one. Speculation actually reflects an inefficient market and a lack of supply. If regulation is inadequate and not enough housing is built, speculation persists, and price caps disincentivize investment. Limits on rent, while protecting current tenants, reduce supply and drive out owners and investors. Regulation of temporary rentals and rooms also disincentivizes supply, pushing small owners to sell or turn to the black market. Can the administration compensate for this exit with public housing? International experience indicates that it cannot, especially in countries with high bureaucracy and little tradition of real public housing. The key is to build more, including social and quality housing. Well-regulated markets facilitate mobility and price adjustments to purchasing power. Abundance policies, like those in Japan or China, have solved the problem without large state resources, simply aligning incentives and regulating appropriately. Innovation is also part of the solution: co-living, flex-living, new construction techniques, and smart mobility can adapt to current needs. Countries like the Netherlands are betting on new cities to respond to population growth. Finally, social policy must ask what kind of middle class we want: one rooted in the territory with real assets, or a volatile and disconnected one, with savings in global financial assets. The middle class is a key social institution for stability and democracy. Public policies actively shape its profile and, with it, the future of the country. Policies that promote supply, like in the Chinese automotive industry, generate competition, low prices, and benefits for citizens. They are truly progressive because they improve people's lives. The major problem for many European governments is that their policies, guided by ideology and hostility, do not address the real problems of citizens nor leverage knowledge on how to design effective markets and policies. Source: elnacional.cat